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 Discrimination and Sexual Misconduct: Administrative and Legal Updates 
 The last year has been one of administrative change with the new Presidential 
administration and the appointments of Besty DeVos as Secretary of Education, and Candice 
Jackson as the Acting Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights for the Department of Education’s 
Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”).  The new OCR administration rescinded a number of Obama 
era guidance documents regarding Title IX, indicated an intention of engaging in formal public 
rulemaking to replace the defunct guidance on sexual misconduct, and edited the case processing 
manual for OCR investigations.  The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) similarly reversed course on 
prior interpretation of Title VII, holding that DOJ would not enforce an application of Title VII 
to include discrimination on the basis of transgender status.  And of course, in the courts, these 
issues continued to be battled out, notwithstanding the changing winds of the administrative 
agencies. 
I. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights and Department of Justice: 
Changes, Changes, Changes 
A. OCR: Rescinding Prior Guidance Documents on Transgender Students 
In a Dear Colleague Letter dated February 22, 2017 (“February DCL”), OCR rescinded 
(1) a Letter to Emily Prince from James A. Ferg-Cadima, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Policy, Office for Civil Rights at the Department of Education dated January 7, 2015; and (2) 
Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students jointly issued by the Civil Rights Division of the 
Department of Justice and the Department of Education dated May 13, 2016.  Both documents 
took “the position that the prohibitions on discrimination ‘on the basis of sex’ in Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., and its implementing 
regulations, see, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 106.33, require access to sex-segregated facilities based on 
gender identity.” In explaining the reason for the rescission, OCR indicated that the two 
documents did not “contain extensive legal analysis or explain how the position is consistent 
with the express language of Title IX, nor did they undergo any formal public process.”  The 
February DCL further cited a growing split among the federal circuit courts regarding whether 
the Title IX prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex included gender identity: 
This interpretation has given rise to significant litigation regarding school 
restrooms and locker rooms. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit concluded that the term “sex” in the regulations is ambiguous and 
deferred to what the court characterized as the “novel” interpretation 
advanced in the guidance. By contrast, a federal district court in Texas held 
that the term “sex” unambiguously refers to biological sex and that, in any 
event, the guidance was “legislative and substantive” and thus formal 
rulemaking should have occurred prior to the adoption of any such policy. 
In August of 2016, the Texas court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of 
the interpretation, and that nationwide injunction has not been overturned. 
The February DCL indicated that OCR would “further and more completely consider the 
legal issues involved.”   The DCL ended that though OCR was rescinding the two documents: 
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 Please note that this withdrawal of these guidance documents does not leave 
students without protections from discrimination, bullying, or harassment. 
All schools must ensure that all students, including LGBT students, are able 
to learn and thrive in a safe environment. The Department of Education 
Office for Civil Rights will continue its duty under law to hear all claims of 
discrimination and will explore every appropriate opportunity to protect all 
students and to encourage civility in our classrooms. The Department of 
Education and the Department of Justice are committed to the application of 
Title IX and other federal laws to ensure such protection. 
 Then, on June 6, 2016, OCR issued a field memorandum to all Regional Directors further 
clarifying enforcement of Title IX with respect to transgender individuals in the wake of the 
February DCL withdrawal of the Obama era guidance documents.   The memorandum indicates 
that Regional Directors should rely on Title IX, its implementing regulations, relevant decisions 
of federal courts, and OCR guidance documents that remain in effect when evaluating sex 
discrimination complaints, regardless of whether the complainant is transgender.  The document 
provided a list of five scenarios in which OCR could assert jurisdiction over a complaint 
involving transgendered individuals: (1) failure of a school to promptly and equitably resolve a 
transgender student’s complaint of sex discrimination; (2) failure to assess whether sexual or 
gender-based harassment, such as reports of individuals refusing to use a transgendered student’s 
preferred pronouns or intimidation/hostility based on sex-stereotypes, creates a hostile 
environment; (3) failure to take steps reasonably calculated to address sexual or gender-based 
harassment that create a hostile environment; (4) retaliation against a transgender student for 
raising concerns about sex discrimination; and (5) different treatment based on sex stereotyping.   
The memorandum also encouraged Regional Directors to treated each complaint with care and 
individualized attention and to search “for a permissible jurisdictional basis for OCR to retain 
and pursue the complaint,” noting that flexibility should apply to cases where one allegation can 
move forward (e.g., harassment based on sex or gender stereotypes), but the other may not (e.g., 
denial of access to restrooms based on gender identity).   
B. Department of Justice - Title VII Does Not Protect Transgendered Employees 
 Of note, the Department of Justice soon followed OCR’s lead and issued a memorandum 
on October 5, 2017, reversing prior Obama administration policy and holding that Title VII does 
not does not prohibit discrimination against transgender persons.  The DOJ’s interpretation is at 
odds with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) interpretation of the scope 
of Title VII, as well as a number of federal courts (as will be explained in the subsequent section 
on case law).   
C. OCR Rescinding Prior OCR Guidance on Title IX/Sexual Misconduct 
 On September 22, 2017, OCR issued a Dear Colleague letter (“September DCL”), which 
rescinded the April 4, 2011 Dear Colleague Letter on Sexual Violence and the April 29, 2014 
Question and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence. OCR noted that in rescinding these 
documents, it intends to engage in rulemaking on the topic of schools’ Title IX responsibilities 
concerning complaints of sexual misconduct and harassment, including soliciting input from 
stakeholders and the public during that rulemaking process. The September DCL noted that in 
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 the interim, OCR would continue to rely upon the 2001 Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, 
along with a new document - Q&A on Campus Sexual Misconduct (“September Q&A”) - issued 
at the same time as the September DCL.  Though more fulsome guidance is eventually expected, 
some highlights from the Q&A are worth noting: 
• Standard of proof: The Q&A states that schools may elect to use one of two 
legal standard investigating/adjudicating reports of sexual misconduct - 
“preponderance of the evidence” or “clear and convincing.”  OCR’s position here 
is a reversal from the 2011 DCL and 2014 Q&A, which unequivocally held that 
schools were expected to employ the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.  
However, in a footnote, the September Q&A advised that in choosing which 
standard to apply to sexual misconduct cases, each school should utilize the 
standard that is consistent with the school’s disciplinary process for other forms of 
student misconduct.  
• What is an “equitable” investigation: Though not technically in contradiction 
with the 2011 DCL or the 2014 Q&A, the September Q&A places a fine point on 
the investigator’s responsibility to “synthesize all available evidence - including 
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence . . .”  
• Length of investigation:  Abandoning the 2011 DCL instruction that 
investigations be completed in 60 days, the September Q&A states that there is no 
set timeframe for completion of investigation.  However, the 2001 Guidance 
requirement that investigations be “prompt” remains. 
• Interim measures: The September Q&A states that in determining the need for 
interim measures, schools may not favor one party over the other and must make 
all measures available to all parties equally.  This point is not a major change 
from the 2011 DCL, but does seem inconsistent with the prior recommendation 
that in implementing interim measures, schools should seek to minimize the 
burden on the complainant.   
• Use of Mediation in Informal Resolution: The September Q&A reverses the 
2011 DCL and 2014 Q&A blanket ban on the use of voluntary mediation in 
sexual misconduct cases.  The September Q&A states that mediation, when all 
parties voluntarily agree, may be appropriate in some, though not all 
circumstances.  This statement is consistent with the 2001 Guidance, which 
permitted mediation, but noted that in some situations, like those involving sexual 
assault, mediation may not be appropriate.    
• Communication about investigations: The September Q&A states that “gag 
orders” or any restriction on the parties to communicate about the investigation 
are prohibited.  The section reflects the current OCR view that any restriction on 
discussion of the investigation could deprive the parties from the ability to gather 
evidence. 
3 
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 • Appeals:  Consistent with prior guidance, the September Q&A does nor require 
an appeal process.  However, the current Q&A permits schools that choose to 
offer an appeal process to do so for either (1) the respondent only; or (2) both 
parties equally. 
Perhaps disappointing to some, the Q&A explicitly noted that existing resolution 
agreements would remain in place. The 2001 Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance is worth a 
review for a reminder as to what has not changed during this interim period pending issuance of 
new regulations.  Further, the September DCL did not rescind the 2015 Dear Colleague Letter on 
Title IX Coordinators and Resource Guide, meaning the documents remains a reflection of OCR 
view, even with the rescission of other prior guidance documents.   
D. Reformulating OCR Investigations 
 On March 5, 2018, OCR launched a new version of the Case Processing Manual, which 
serves as the road map for OCR handling of complaints against and compliance reviews of 
covered institutions.  Many schools with open OCR investigations had already noticed a change 
in the manner in which OCR handled investigation under the Trump administration.  
Anecdotally, over the past year, OCR has been issuing far fewer broad requests for systemic 
institutional information (often requesting years of data regarding institution’s handling of 
reports of sexual misconduct) that had typically accompanied individual complaint notices under 
the prior administration.  The formal changes to the Case Processing Manual appear to be 
consistent with this evolving practice.  The new manual no longer references “systemic” 
investigations - though Secretary of Education Devos commented that OCR retains the authority 
to conduct such investigations when warranted. The changes also remove an appeal process for 
complainants and narrows the time for providing evidence during the OCR investigation into a 
complaint.  The changes appear to be part of a broader effort to clear the backlog of open OCR 
cases by narrowing the scope of investigations and getting cases to resolution more quickly and 
efficiently.  The current version of the manual strengthens language regarding the circumstances 
under which investigators must dismiss complaints.  The prior version of the manual listed a 
number of basis upon which an investigator “should” close an investigation, but allowed for 
investigator discretion to continue investigation if systemic issues were suspected.  The new 
version changes that “should” to a “will,” meaning investigators must dismiss when one of the 
eleven basis for dismissal (e.g., information provided by complainant fails to state a violation).   
II. Case Law Developments 
A. Evolving and Conflicting Standards for Gender Identity Cases 
On the heels of the shifts by OCR and DOJ interpretation of Title IX and Title VII, 
respectively, a case from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals suggests courts may be veering in 
a different direction.  In Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School District No. 1 Board of Education, 
858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017), the Seventh Circuit upheld a transgender high school students 
preliminary injunction against his school on the grounds that he demonstrated a likelihood of 
success that the school’s restriction on which bathroom he could use violated Title IX and the 
U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.  With respect to Title IX, the court analogized the 
student’s claim to Title VII claims asserting sex-stereotyping under Supreme Court precedent in 
4 
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 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and held that the student demonstrated a 
likelihood of success of establishing that the school bathroom policy was inappropriately based 
on sex-stereotypes.  As for the Equal Protection claim, the court held that the student 
demonstrated a high likelihood of success because the school’s bathroom policy constituted a 
sex-based classification and was thus subject to “heightened scrutiny.”   
A case from federal court in the Western District of Oklahoma signals a similar departure 
from federal administrative policy.  In Tudor v. Southeastern Oklahoma State University, et al., 
No. CIV-15-324-C, (W.D. Okla. Oct. 26, 2017), a professor at the university claimed that upon 
announcing she would be transitioning from male to female, she began to experience 
discrimination and harassment, which culminated in denial of tenure and termination of 
employment.  Plaintiff filed her claims under Title VII and the university moved for summary 
judgment. 
In denying the university’s motion for summary judgement, the court rejected the 
university’s argument that Title VII did not extend protection to those claiming discrimination on 
the basis of gender identity.  The court, relying on prior decision, held that claims based on 
“gender-nonconformity” could rightly be considered as potential violations of Title VII’s 
prohibition on gender discrimination.  Further and of particular note, the court also held that 
evidence that the university restricted which bathroom Plaintiff could use, instructed her how to 
present herself, and used her non-preferred pronouns when referencing her could substantiate a 
hostile environment claim if found to be true.  The Court also rejected the university’s 
Faragher/Ellereth defense because the University’s discrimination and harassment policies did 
not include specific protections for transgendered employees.   
B. Schools on Trial for Handling of Sexual Misconduct Reports 
Not surprisingly litigation over institutional handling of sexual misconduct cases - from 
both complainants and respondents - continued apace throughout 2017 and into the new year.  
The following is just a small selection of cases to note. 
1. Due Process - The Role of Cross-Examination 
Doe v. University of Cincinnati, et al., 872 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2017) -  
In Doe, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a preliminary injunction on the 
suspension of a University of Cincinnati student - Doe - who had been found responsible for 
sexually assaulting a fellow student, Jane Roe.  In appealing his suspension to the district court, 
Doe argued that the University violated his due process right to a fair hearing by denying him the 
right to confront Roe before finding him responsible for sexual assault.  Granting a preliminary 
injunction with respect to Doe’s suspension, the district found a strong likelihood that Doe would 
prevail on his constitutional claims.  The Sixth Circuit agreed and the court’s reasoning is 
instructive for public universities investigation and adjudicating sexual misconduct claims. 
By way of background, Doe and Roe met on Tinder and after a couple weeks of 
communicating, they met in person.  Doe invited Roe back to his apartment where the two had 
sex.  Three weeks later, Roe reported to the University’s Title IX office that Doe had sexually 
assaulted her that night.  Pursuant to University procedures, the Title IX Office investigated the 
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 report and forwarded the collected evidence to the parties and to the Administrative Review 
Committee (ARC) for hearing.  According to University procedures, during this hearing, accused 
students are permitted to present evidence, explain their version of events, and engage in a 
limited version of cross-examination of witnesses by submitting questions to the ARC panelists 
who then determine whether the questions are relevant and should be posed to the witness.  
Crucial to the court’s analysis here, University policy does not require that witnesses appear for 
the hearing and if a witness does not attend, the witness may instead submit a notarized 
statement.   
Though Roe provided her account of the encounter with Doe to the Title IX investigator, 
she failed to appear for the hearing.   Rather she provided a written closing statement.  The panel 
read the Title IX report, as well as a summary of Roe’s statement, and the statements of 
witnesses interviews into the record.  Doe submitted to questioning from the panel, disputed 
various parts of Roe’s statement, and orally provided his own written statement.  At the close of 
the hearing, the ARC found Doe responsible for violating the Student Code of Conduct and 
recommended a suspension of two years.  Upon appeal, the suspension was reduced to one year.  
Doe then filed suit alleging that the University had violated his rights under the United States and 
Ohio Constitutions and  discriminated against him in violation of Title IX.  Doe also filed for 
preliminary relief to enjoin the University from enforcing the suspension.  That motion focused 
solely on Doe’s argument that the University could not constitutionally find him responsible for 
sexually assaulting Roe without any opportunity to question her. 
As a plethora of case law across circuits confirms, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed the 
premise that state universities must afford students a minimum of due process before issuing 
significant disciplinary decisions.  The court further reminded that the property rights and liberty 
interests of students in public institutions are clearly implicated by both suspension and the 
allegation of sexual assault (which may impugn a student’s reputation and integrity).  The court 
acknowledged that the right to cross-examine has not typically been considered an essential 
requirement of due process in school disciplinary proceedings.  However, the court caveated that 
this standard is not absolute and that the more serious the misconduct at issue- and consequently, 
the graver the potential consequence- the more process is required.  The court wrote that as in the 
case of Roe’s report against Doe, where the panel was essentially tasked with making a 
credibility determination between the accounts of Roe and Doe, some form of cross examination 
was essential to a fair hearing.  In a lengthy explanation on the history and value of the process 
of cross-examination, the court noted that the ability to cross-examine the individual alleging 
serious misconduct, like sexual assault, is critical to assessing credibility where no other 
corroborating evidence is presented.  Because the University panel essentially made a credibility 
determination to affirm Roe’s allegations without actually questioning her or permitting Doe to 
question her via the limited cross-examination process provided for in the panel procedures, the 
panel likely deprived Doe of a fair hearing.   
The entire decision is worth a read.  There are a few important limitations to the court’s 
holding.  First, Doe did not challenge the constitutional sufficiency of the University’s  
procedure of permitting the accused to question witnesses or the complainant through questions 
submitted to the panel.  Rather, the basis of his due process claim was that Roe did not appear 
and thus did subject herself to questioning and deprived Doe his procedural right to submit 
questions to be directed to her.  The court nodded at this distinction, noting that the due process 
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 obligations for the University with respect to cross-examination are narrow in that the University 
need only provide some mechanism for meaningfully evaluating credibility, not necessarily 
permitting the accused to physically confront the accuser.  The court specifically noted that the 
University’s process for submitting questions, if it had been followed, likely would have cleared 
this bar. Second, the court’s holding appears to focus on what have typically been called “he 
said-she said,” or more recently “word-on-word,” cases for which no physical or other 
corroborative evidence exists.  The court highlighted that the fact that the decision of 
responsibility rested solely on the determination of which version of events seems more likely 
rendered the need for some sort of credibility measure, like cross-examination, all the more 
critical. Third, in response to a secondary argument by Doe that the University panel should not 
have relied on hearsay evidence - that is, the Title IX report and witness statements - in 
determining his responsibility, the court wrote that nothing in the holding should be construed as 
limiting the University’s ability to rely on hearsay evidence in its disciplinary proceedings.  
Rather the court noted that Doe’s due process rights were violated because the hearsay evidence 
introduced issues of credibility between the parties that could only be fairly resolved through 
questioning Roe.  And finally, the holding is limited too public institutions who are subject to the 
due process provisions of the U.S. Constitution.   
Plummer, et al. v. Univ. of Houston, No. 15-20350 (5th Cir. Jun. 23, 2017) 
In Plummer, the Fifth Circuit evaluated a different set of facts regarding the necessity of 
some form of cross-examination in public institution disciplinary proceedings and held that 
confrontation of the accuser was not critical to a fair hearing.  But, as will be explained further, 
the court’s holing in Plummer rests on specific facts, rendering it entirely consistent with the 
Sixth Circuit decision in Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati.  Plaintiffs were Plummer and McConnell, 
two former university students at the University of Houston - a public university - who were then 
dating.  Plummer came to McConnell’s room one night and found him naked and intoxicated 
with another women.  Plummer took video of the two and posted it on social media.  The video 
purportedly showed, among other things, McConnell engaging in sexual activity on the student 
while she was passed out.  The conduct was reported and the University held two evidentiary 
hearings, eventually finding McConnell responsible for sexual assault and Plummer responsible 
for recording the sexual activity of another.  Both were expelled and then filed suit after 
appealing the findings and sanctions.  Plaintiffs asserted that the hearing process denied them 
due process because (1) they did not have adequate notice of adverse evidence; (2) they were not 
able to confront the student who accused them; (3) cross-examination was limited to written 
questions; and (4) the investigator was conflicted because he also served as victim advocate.  The 
Plaintiffs also asserted Title IX claims on the basis of differential treatment toward the accusing 
student and deliberate indifference to the constitutional inadequacies of the process.  The 
University moved for summary judgment, which was granted.  Plaintiffs appealed. 
The court upheld the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ case on summary judgement citing that the 
Plaintiffs had had multiple, meaningful opportunities to challenge the University’s allegations, 
evidence and findings.  Critical to the court’s reasoning was that the University possessed video 
evidence of the alleged behavior, which was so graphic and clear, that no additional procedural 
safeguards would have lessened the risk of erroneous outcome.  The court then addressed each of 
the four alleged areas of due process deprivation in turn.  With respect to the claim that the 
University failed to give appropriate notice of the existence of adverse witnesses, the court held 
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 that even if more notice could have been provided, this alleged failure would not have lessened 
the potential of erroneous outcome because the findings relied so heavily on video and 
photographic evidence (the authenticity of which neither Plaintiff apparently challenged).  As for 
the confrontation and cross-examination claims, the court specifically noted that the case “does 
not require that we determine whether confrontation and cross-examination would ever be 
constitutionally required in student disciplinary proceedings.”  Similar to the reasoning of the 
Sixth Circuit - though reaching a different result based on the facts  - the court held that the lack 
of direct confrontation and cross-examination was not a procedural deficiency in this case 
because the University relied primarily on the videos and photo taken by Plummer, not the 
testimony of the student who later reported the conduct.  Nor did either Plaintiff contend that the 
student’s testimony or scrutiny under questioning would somehow suggest that she consented to 
the behavior in which  the Plaintiffs reportedly engaged.  And with respect to the multiple roles 
of the investigator, the court held that the investigator’s service as the victim advocate alone 
could not establish bias without other evidence that the integrity of the proceedings had been 
undermined.  Again, noting on the reliance of visual evidence, the court indicated that Plaintiffs 
adduced no evidence that a different investigator would have reached a different outcome.  The 
court also nodded to other procedural safeguards present in the University’s process, specifically 
that the hearing panel was instructed that they were free to disagree with the investigator’s 
findings. 
Finally, the court made short work of the Title IX claims.  With respect to the differential 
treatment claim, the court disposed of it by noting that one plaintiff was male and the other 
female, suggesting they had been treated similarly for purposes of the University disciplinary 
process.  And as for the deliberate indifference claim, the court noted that while the university’s 
process was wanting in some areas of procedural protection, in light of the facts elucidated in the 
due process analysis, the evidence did not support a finding of deliberate indifference. 
***Interesting note here, the dissent to this case by Judge Edith Jones is worth a read for 
the differing viewpoint.  She argues that the Fifth Circuit decision is a “canary in the coal mine” 
for student procedural due process rights, summarizing the court’s reasoning as “the panel 
implies that because they were guilty, they got enough due process.”  Specifically, Judge Jones 
opines that the court’s holding here is in contradiction with Supreme Court precedent in Carey v. 
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), in which that Supreme Court held that public school students who 
were suspended for a few weeks without hearing were deprived of due process rights, even 
though they did not dispute they engaged in the conduct for which they were sanctioned.  In 
other words, the deprivation of due process was sufficiently actionable injury, even if no other 
actual injury was suffered.  According to Judge Jones, in the present case, several process issues 
constituted due process violations: (1) the absence of a complaint filed by the affected student; 
(2) Baker’s dual and conflicting role as advocate and investigator; (3) use of the preponderance 
of the evidence standard (which she also argues was inaccurately explained to the hearing panel); 
and (4) evidence that the investigator insisted on deference to his findings and position to the 
hearing panel. 
2. Circuit Split on Title IX Discrimination Pleading Standards 
Doe v. Miami University, 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018) 
8 
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 Plaintiff, John Doe, a male student at Miami University in Ohio filed suit against the 
university and several individuals after a disciplinary panel found him responsible for sexual 
misconduct.  Doe filed suit alleging a number of Title IX violations and violation of 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.  The University moved to dismiss, 
which the district court granted.  Doe appealed.  In a February 9, 2018 decision, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated some of Doe’s claims.  In doing so, the Sixth Circuit 
applied traditional pleading standard to Title IX cases, splitting from recent Second Circuit 
precedent in Doe v. Columbia University, 831 F. 3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016), officially setting a circuit 
split.   
In the Second Circuit case, the court adopted a lower pleading standard for Title IX 
discrimination claims - identical to the one it adopted for Title VII employment discrimination 
cases - in which plaintiffs need only plead a “minimal plausible inference” of discriminatory 
intent to survive motion to dismiss.  The Sixth Circuit in Doe expressly declined to apply that 
lower standard, noting it had also not adopted the lower pleading standard articulated by the 
Second Circuit for Title VII cases and would thus not do so for Title IX.  The court reaffirmed 
that in the Sixth Circuit, plaintiff must still plead sufficient facts that the discriminatory intent of 
defendant is “plausible on its face,” as required by Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal.  
Based on this holding, the Court reinstated only one of Doe’s three Title IX claims 
(erroneous outcome).   The Court held that Doe’s claim that the University’s pursuit of 
disciplinary action against and not the female complainant based on a kiss, during which he 
alleged neither had capacity to consent, was sufficiently plead.  The Court also reinstated Doe’s 
Equal Protection Due Process claims, holding that Doe’s allegation that his Due Process rights 
were violated because the hearing panel was biased was sufficiently plead to survive motion to 
dismiss.  In particular, the court noted that the confluence of the allegations that (1) one of the 
hearing panel members wore multiple hats in the process as both investigator and adjudicator and 
(2) that same panel member had allegedly made several statements that suggested she was not 
impartial was enough to permit the due process claim to proceed. 
3. Proving Deliberate Indifference  
Ross v. University of Tulsa, 859 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2017) 
Plaintiff Abigail Ross reported that she was raped by a fellow student at the University of 
Tulsa. The University conducted a student-conduct hearing on the report, but declined to 
consider a prior report of rape levied against the same accused student.  Plaintiff sued the 
University for money damages under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 
asserting two separate theories of the University’s deliberate indifference. On the first theory, 
Plaintiff asserted that the University acted with deliberate indifference by failing to investigate a 
2012 report to campus security that the same accused student raped another student, after that 
student requested the campus security officers take no further action; thus permitting the accused 
student to assault Plaintiff years later.  On the second theory, Plaintiff argued that the University 
acted with deliberate indifference by excluding the 2012 reports from the hearing on her report.  
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the University of Tulsa, and plaintiff 
appealed. The Tenth Circuit concluded both theories failed as a matter of law. 
9 
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 With respect to the first theory, the court held that a fact-finder could have reasonably 
found that the campus security officers acted with deliberate indifference by not pursuing 
investigation of the sexual assault report, notwithstanding the request of the affected student to 
the contrary, because the reported rape put the officer on actual notice of a potential threat on 
campus.  However, the court noted that the same could not be held for the University because the 
actual notice of the campus security officers could not be imputed to the University.  
Specifically, the court held that the campus security officers were not “appropriate persons” for 
purposes of Title IX through which the University could receive notice of the rape.  The court 
explained that under Title IX precedent an “appropriate person” is one who is authorized by the 
school to take corrective action in response to a report of prohibited conduct.  The court observed 
that under the University’s reporting procedures, campus security officers must report rapes or 
sexual misconduct to the Office of Student Affairs, which in turn is authorized to initiate 
corrective action.  In the case of the 2012 reported rape, the campus security officers did not 
forward the report and as such, failed to put the University on notice of the incident.  Plaintiff 
argued that because the campus security officers were required to “initiate” the corrective action 
process by forwarding a report to the Office of Student Affairs, they could reasonably be 
considered “appropriate persons” for purposes of notice to the University.  The court disagreed, 
holding that to confirm that view would be to inappropriately extend Title IX liability beyond 
Supreme Court precedent and convert the deliberate indifference standard to one of vicarious 
liability.   
As for the second theory, the court held that the University’s exclusion of the 2012 report 
of rape from the misconduct hearing concerning Plaintiff’s report also was insufficient to 
establish deliberate indifference.  The court cited that the University relied on its own internal 
procedural rule that evidence of prior acts could not be considered unless the acts had been 
subject to a separate trial or conduct proceeding that resulted in a finding of responsibility.  
Plaintiff argued that the procedural rule was not unreasonable on its face, but that its application 
in her case was unreasonable because the University allegedly failed to properly investigate the 
2012 report.  The court disagreed, noting that the university’s procedural rule was not only 
reasonable and compliant with OCR Title IX guidance, but also applied appropriately in 
Plaintiff’s situation.   Plaintiff also argued that the university should have investigated the 2012 
report (as well as another report that came to light later in the proceedings) along with hers so 
that the reports could be adjudicated together.  The court also rejected this argument, noting that 
the university’s decision not to investigate the 2012 report was not unreasonable, given the lapse 
of time and the refusal of that complainant to participate in a school investigation.   
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